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Primates are remarkably adept at ranking each other
within social hierarchies, a capacity that is critical to
successful group living. Surprisingly little, however,
is understood about the neurobiology underlying
this quintessential aspect of primate cognition. In
our experiment, participants first acquired knowl-
edge about a social and a nonsocial hierarchy and
then used this information to guide investment deci-
sions. We found that neural activity in the amygdala
tracked the development of knowledge about a
social, but not a nonsocial, hierarchy. Further, struc-
tural variations in amygdala gray matter volume
accounted for interindividual differences in social
transitivity performance. Finally, the amygdala ex-
pressed a neural signal selectively coding for social
rank, whose robustness predicted the influence of
rank on participants’ investment decisions. In con-
trast, we observed that the linear structure of both
social and nonsocial hierarchies was represented at
a neural level in the hippocampus. Our study impli-
cates the amygdala in the emergence and represen-
tation of knowledge about social hierarchies and
distinguishes the domain-general contribution of
the hippocampus.
INTRODUCTION
Primates have sophisticated cognitive abilities that enable indi-
viduals to meet the challenging pressures of living in large social
groups (Byrne and Bates, 2010; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990;
Tomasello and Call, 1997). Foremost among these is the
capacity to judge the relative rank of others, which enables indi-
viduals to select advantageous coalition partners, and avoid
potentially injurious conflicts (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Tom-
asello and Call, 1997). Two different sources of information may
be used to guide judgments of social rank: first, the physical
appearance of an individual (e.g., facial features and body
posture: Karafin et al., 2004; Marsh et al., 2009; Todorov et al.,
2008; Zink et al., 2008)—and second, specific knowledge of
the hierarchical structure of the social group, accrued throughexperience of previous encounters and interactions (Byrne and
Bates, 2010; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Grosenick et al.,
2007; Paz-Y-Min˜o et al., 2004). While perceptual cues may
provide a useful, but relatively imprecise, heuristic with which
to rapidly evaluate an unfamiliar individual (e.g., an intruder:
Marsh et al., 2009; Todorov et al., 2008; Whalen, 1998), specific
knowledge of the rank position of a fellow group member is
needed to support more accurate judgments of rank (Cheney
and Seyfarth, 1990; Tomasello and Call, 1997). Indeed, consid-
erable evidence indicates that humans and nonhuman primates
possess such knowledge, and are able to rank each other within
linear hierarchies that are stable over long periods of time (Byrne
and Bates, 2010; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Savin-Williams,
1990). For instance, primates spontaneously discriminate
images of individuals based on their rank status (Deaner et al.,
2005) and are able to identify third-party relations that exist
between their companions—when engaged in a competitive
interaction (e.g., a duel) individuals will typically recruit allies
that outrank both themselves and their opponents (e.g., favoring
the 3rd ranked individual over the fifth ranked) (Cheney and
Seyfarth, 1990; Tomasello and Call, 1997).
According to psychological theories grounded in research in
animals, individuals acquire knowledge about social hierarchies
by experiencing encounters between pairs of conspecifics, with
such dyadic interactions either being experimentally enforced
(Grosenick et al., 2007; Paz-Y-Min˜o et al., 2004) or occurring
through the course of natural behavior (Cheney and Seyfarth,
1990; Tomasello and Call, 1997). Notably, however, individuals
must confront a thorny obstacle during learning: the number of
possible dyadic interactions scales exponentially with group
size, thereby placing prohibitive demands on memory capacity
(Byrne and Bates, 2010; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990). Evidence
suggests that individuals solve this problem in an elegant
fashion—by restricting their observations to a small subset of
all possible dyadic interactions, and then using a highly devel-
oped capacity for transitive inference to deduce the remaining
rank relations between group members (i.e., if P1 > P2 & P2 >
P3, then P1 > 3, where P1 denotes the highest ranking individual)
(Byrne and Bates, 2010; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Grosenick
et al., 2007; Paz-Y-Min˜o et al., 2004). Indeed, it has been argued
that the pressures of living in large social groupsmay have driven
the evolution of sophisticated abilities for transitive inference,
based on the finding that the more highly social of two closely
related primate species exhibit superior capacities in this regard
(e.g., Maclean et al., 2008).Neuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 653
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rank judgments depend critically on knowledge about linear
social hierarchies that is acquired through learning, and a highly
developed capacity for transitive inference (Byrne and Bates,
2010; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Grosenick et al., 2007; Paz-
Y-Min˜o et al., 2004). Surprisingly little, however, is understood
about the neurobiology underlying these core aspects of primate
cognition. While previous work suggests that lesions to the
amygdala in nonhuman primates (Kling, 1992; Machado and
Bachevalier, 2006; Rosvold et al., 1954; although see Bauman
et al., 2006) and the medial prefrontal cortex in mice (Wang
et al., 2011) may cause affected individuals to fall in rank within
the group, the role of these brain regions in representing knowl-
edge about social hierarchies has not been investigated. In
humans, previous fMRI studies have tended to investigate how
status, a construct which relates broadly to rank, influences
neural processing—where the status of an individual was well
known to participants prior to the experiment (e.g., the Queen
of England: Chiao et al., 2009; Farrow et al., 2011) or conveyed
by perceptual cues (e.g., body posture, attire: Marsh et al.,
2009; Zink et al., 2008). For instance, Zink et al. (2008) compared
neural activity while participants viewed the face of a superior
player, whose status was declared by the number of stars pre-
sented on the screen (e.g., three-star rating)—rather than learned
through experience—with that of an inferior player (e.g., two-star
rating). Based on existing evidence, therefore, the neural mech-
anisms by which knowledge about social hierarchies emerges
through experience and is represented in the human brain
remains a fundamental but open question in neuroscience.
To address these issues, we employed a two-phase experi-
mental scenario, in combination with both functional (fMRI) and
structural (voxel-based morphometry—VBM) neuroimaging
techniques. In the first (‘‘Learn’’) phase, we used an experimental
paradigm whose design was motivated by the acknowledged
importance of learning and transitive behavior to social rank
judgments (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Grosenick et al., 2007;
Paz-Y-Min˜o et al., 2004). Participants acquired knowledge about
two seven-item hierarchies in parallel, whose emergence we
could track at both behavioral and neural levels through online
assessments of transitivity performance conducted across this
experimental phase (see Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures available online). One hierarchy, herein termed social
(c.f. Magee and Galinsky, 2008), comprised individual people
in a fictitious company with different levels of power—the other,
herein termed nonsocial, comprised galaxies with different levels
of a precious mineral (Figure 1). In the second (‘‘Invest’’) phase,
participants were required to use the knowledge about hierar-
chies that they had acquired during phase 1, and evaluate
the potential worth of individual people and galaxies to guide
economic pricing decisions. Importantly, person and galaxy
rank were orthogonalized by experimental design in this phase,
enabling us to define how rank information is coded at a neural
level, separately for each stimulus type. Our experiment, there-
fore, was specifically set up to define the neural mechanisms
operating during the emergence of knowledge about social
hierarchies, examine how rank information is coded in the brain,
and dissociate the operation of social-specific from domain-
general processes.654 Neuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Phase 1: Learn
Participants completed training trials, where a pair of adjacent
items in the hierarchy was presented (e.g., P1 versus P2, G1
versus G2, where P = person and G = galaxy; Figure 1A): they
were required to learn through trial and error, which person
had more power (social condition) or which galaxy had more
mineral (nonsocial condition). Following each block of training
trials, participants completed test trials where theywere required
to select the higher ranking of the two items presented (e.g., P3
versus P6, G3 versus G6; Figure 1B) and rate their confidence in
their decision on a scale of 1 (guess) to 3 (very sure). Test trials
differed from training trials in two critical ways: nonadjacent
items in the hierarchy were presented during test trials (e.g.,
P3 versus P6), and no corrective feedback was issued. As
such, participants were required to use transitive inference to
deduce the correct item during test trials (e.g., P3, in a P3 versus
P6 trial), by using knowledge of the underlying hierarchy (e.g.,
P1 > P2 > P3 > P4 > P5 > P6 > P7: see below). In contrast, partic-
ipants could achieve proficient performance on training trials by
simply memorizing the correct item in each pair (e.g., P1, in a P1
versus P2 trial).
While the Learn phase paradigm builds on a rich vein of
research that has used the transitive inference task across
species (Bryant and Trabasso, 1971; Dusek and Eichenbaum,
1997; Greene et al., 2006; Grosenick et al., 2007; Heckers
et al., 2004; Hurliman et al., 2005; Moses et al., 2010; Paz-
Y-Min˜o et al., 2004; Zeithamova et al., 2012), we incorporated
several features designed to achieve the specific goals of our
experiment: first, we interleaved blocks of training and test trials
throughout the time course of the Learn phase in order to chart
the development of successful transitive behavior. In contrast,
previous fMRI studies have typically included test trials only at
the very end of training (Greene et al., 2006; Heckers et al.,
2004; Moses et al., 2010). Second, we incorporated a novel
measure of test trial performance (i.e., ‘‘inference score’’), which
was validated in a separate behavioral experiment (see below
and Supplemental Results). The inference score index - which
incorporated participants’ assessment of their confidence in their
choices, a metacognitive measure typically used to characterize
medial temporal lobe dependent memory processes (e.g., (Ei-
chenbaum et al., 2007)—allowed us to track the emergence of
knowledge of the linear structure of the hierarchy, and thereby
reveal the underlying neural mechanisms. Lastly, our paradigm
wasunique in affording adirect comparison of social (i.e., person)
and nonsocial (i.e., galaxy) hierarchy learning under conditions
where behavioral performance was well matched (Figure 1).
Behavioral Data
Participants improved their performance on training trials and
test trials over the course of the Learn phase: no significant
differences were found between social and nonsocial condi-
tions, either in terms of the correctness of choices or the distribu-
tion of confidence ratings during test trials (ps > 0.1; Figures 1A
and 1B). By the end of this experimental phase, almost all (i.e., 25
out of 26) participants exhibited proficient transitive behavior,
reflected by the inference score index—the one participant
AB
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Figure 1. Learn Phase: Experimental Task and Behavioral Data
(A) Training trials: timeline (left panel), behavioral data (right panel). Participants viewed adjacent items in the hierarchy (P1 P2, G1, G2 illustrated, where
P1 = person of rank equal to 1, and G1 = galaxy of rank equal to 1) and selected the item which they thought had more power (social) or more mineral (nonsocial).
Right panel shows training trial performance across all 15 experimental blocks, averaged across all 6 training trial types (e.g., P1 versus P2, P2 versus P3, etc.) and
participants (person condition: blue, galaxy condition: green, error bars reflect SEM).
(B) Test trials: timeline (left panel), behavioral data (right panel). Participants viewed nonadjacent items in the hierarchy (P3 P6, G3 G6 illustrated), inferred the
higher ranking item, and rated their confidence in their choice—no feedback was provided. Right panel shows inference score index over all 15 experimental
blocks, averaged across all 6 test trial types (e.g., P2 versus P4, P2 versus P5, etc.), and participants (person condition, blue; galaxy condition, green; error bars
reflect SEM). The inference score index (range 0–3) was derived by combining (i.e., multiplying) the correctness of participants’ choices during test trials with their
confidence rating, and indexed the level of hierarchical knowledge attained at a given time point during the Learn phase (see Supplemental Results).
(C) Hierarchy recall test (debriefing session): pictures of the set of people and galaxies were presented to participants, and they were asked to rank them in terms
of their order in the hierarchy, with their performance timed. Example hierarchies are illustrated—note the allocation of person and galaxy to rank position (1 = high
rank, 7 = low rank) was randomized across participants. Right panel (person condition, blue; galaxy condition, green) shows performance (%) on hierarchy recall
test, and time taken (seconds). Error bars reflect SEM.
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Knowledge of Social and Nonsocial Hierarchiesthat performed poorly in both social and nonsocial domains was
excluded from the fMRI analysis.
Several considerations indicate that successful transitive
behavior in our experiment was driven primarily by relational
(or declarative) knowledge of the hierarchy (i.e., P1 > P2 >
P3. > P7) (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Smith and Squire,
2005), whose evolution we were able to track through the use
of the inference score index. First, in our experiment participants
developed near-ceiling levels of transitive performance in thecontext of relatively long (i.e., seven-item) hierarchies—while
alternative (e.g., reinforcement-based procedural; Frank et al.,
2003) mechanisms may underlie modest (e.g., 60% correct)
performance in settings where shorter (i.e., five-item) hierarchies
are involved (e.g., Greene et al., 2006), hierarchy knowledge is
required to mediate the highly proficient transitive behavior we
observed (e.g., Frank et al., 2003). Second, participants ex-
pressed robust knowledge of the two seven-item hierarchies in
the postexperimental debriefing session that followed the endNeuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 655
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Figure 2. Learn Phase, fMRI Results: Neural Activity in the Amygdala
and Anterior Hippocampus Selectively Tracks the Emergence of
Knowledge about Social, but Not Nonsocial, Hierarchies
(A) Activity in bilateral amygdala (left panel, coronal section) and bilateral
anterior hippocampus (right panel, coronal section) shows a significant
correlation with the inference score index in the social domain. Activations
thresholded at p < 0.005 uncorrected for display purposes, and shown over
average structural image of all participants but significant in amygdala and
hippocampus at p < 0.001 uncorrected and p < 0.05 whole-brain FWE cor-
rected at cluster level; colorbar (red-yellow) indicates increasing t values. See
Table S1A for full list of activations.
(B) Activity in left amygdala/anterior hippocampus (left panel, coronal section)
and right amygdala (right panel, sagittal section) shows a significantly greater
correlation with the inference score index in the social, as compared to the
nonsocial, domain. Activations thresholded at p < 0.005 uncorrected for
display purposes but significant in amygdala and hippocampus at p < 0.001
uncorrected and p < 0.05 SVC corrected; see Table S1B for full list of
activations.
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asked to recall the order of items in both hierarchies, with no
significant difference observed between social and nonsocial
hierarchies, in terms of accuracy, or response time: both
ps > 0.1 (Figure 1C). Third, in a separate behavioral study we
found that the inference score index showed a robust correlation
with participants’ knowledge of the hierarchy—as measured by
a direct test (e.g., Smith and Squire, 2005)—even once the
correctness of participants’ test trial (and training trial) responses
had been partialled out (see Supplemental Results). These data,
therefore, in demonstrating that the inference score index has
objective explanatory value (c.f. the binary choice data alone),
provide support for its use as a proxy for the level of hierarchical
knowledge attained by a given participant over the time course
of the Learn phase.
Functional Neuroimaging (fMRI) Data
Neural Activity in the Amygdala/Anterior Hippocampus
Selectively Tracks the Emergence of Knowledge about
a Social Hierarchy
Given behavioral evidence that participants acquired knowledge
about both social and nonsocial hierarchies over the course of
the Learn phase, and furnished with an online index tracking its
emergence, we next turned to fMRI data. We created partici-
pant-specific trial-by-trial parametric regressors that we used
to regress against the test trial fMRI data, with separate regres-
sors included for social (i.e., person) and nonsocial (i.e., galaxy)
conditions. A vector coding for the inference score on a given
test trial – derived by multiplying the correctness of the response
(i.e., 0 or 1) with the confidence rating (i.e., 1 = guess, 2 = not
sure, 3 = sure; see Supplemental Experimental Procedures)—
was entered as a parametric regressor. Earlier regressors in
the same general linear model captured effects attributable to
changes in reaction time or overall performance (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures). Of note, the automatic serial
orthogonalization procedure carried out by SPM8 results in
shared variance among regressors being captured by earlier
regressors. This procedure, therefore, allows one to ask in which
brain regions neural activity during test trials tracks the develop-
ment of successful transitivity choices supported by hierarchy
knowledge, and cannot be explained by nonspecific effects—
related to the contribution of alternative (e.g., procedural-based)
mechanisms to overall performance, or changes in attention.
We first sought to identify brain regions where neural activity
on a given test trial specifically tracked the development of
knowledge about a social hierarchy, by using our trial-by-trial
measure of transitivity performance—the inference score index -
as leverage with which to interrogate the fMRI data. Strikingly,
we found that neural activity within the amygdala and anterior
hippocampus, as well as posterior hippocampus, and ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC), showed a significant correlation
with the inference score index in the social domain (Figure 2A;
Table S1A). Moreover, we found that the correlation between
neural activity in the amygdala/anterior hippocampus and the
inference score was specific to the social domain: no such corre-
lation was observed in these regions even at liberal statistical
thresholds (i.e., p < 0.01 uncorrected) in the nonsocial domain.
Further, we observed that neural activity in these areas—in656 Neuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.a cluster that included the left anterior hippocampus/amygdala,
as well as right amygdala—showed a significantly greater corre-
lation with the inference score in the social domain, as compared
to the nonsocial domain (Figure 2B; Table S1B).
Interestingly, as was the case in the social domain, we did
observe a significant correlation between neural activity and
inference score in the posterior hippocampus, and vMPFC, in
the nonsocial domain (Figure 3A; Table S2A)—a finding that
points toward a domain-general role for these regions, and
which we further characterize in a subsequent (i.e., conjunction)
analysis (see later and Table S2B). No brain regions exhibited
a correlation that was significantly greater in the nonsocial, as
compared to the social, domain (Table S2C).
Our evidence, in pointing toward a specific link between neural
activity in the amygdala/anterior hippocampus and the develop-
ment of knowledge about social hierarchies, is highly consistent
with previous evidence suggesting that the amygdala plays an
important role in emotional memory (McGaugh, 2004; Phelps
and LeDoux, 2005; Somerville et al., 2006), through anatomical
AB
Figure 3. Learn Phase, fMRI Results: Neural Activity in the Posterior
Hippocampus, and vMPFC, Tracks the Emergence of Hierarchical
Knowledge in a Domain-General Fashion
(A) Activity in left posterior hippocampus (left panel: coronal section, right
panel: axial section) shows a significant correlation with the inference score
index in the nonsocial domain. Activations thresholded at p < 0.005 uncor-
rected for display purposes, but significant in hippocampus and vMPFC at
p < 0.001 uncorrected and p < 0.05 SVC corrected. No correlation was
observed in the amygdala even at liberal statistical thresholds (p < 0.01
uncorrected). See Table S2A for full list of activations.
(B) Results of conjunction (null) analysis: activity in left posterior hippocampus
(left panel: coronal section) and vMPFC (right panel: axial section) shows
a significant correlation with inference score index in both social and nonsocial
domains. Activations thresholded at p < 0.005 uncorrected for display
purposes, but significant in hippocampus and vMPFC at p < 0.001 uncor-
rected and p < 0.05 SVC corrected. See Table S2B for full list of activations.
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selow and Dong, 2010; Phelps, 2004). Importantly, the current
findings relate closely to the development of social hierarchical
knowledge and are not easily accounted for by less specific
effects. First, we used a parametric approach—the fMRI results
presented reflect a tight coupling between neural activity and
participant-specific trial-by-trial regressors indexing hierarchical
knowledge attained at a given time point during the Learn phase.
As such, the findings reported from these parametric analyses
cannot be explained by mere perceptual differences between
the stimuli used in social and nonsocial domains (i.e., faces
versus galaxies)—an account that would have had traction had
we used a conventional subtractive strategy (i.e., social minus
nonsocial).
Second, the robust correlation between neural activity in the
amygdala/anterior hippocampus and participants’ performance
in the social domain was restricted to test trials where perfor-
mance depended on knowledge of the hierarchy—and not
observed during training trials where a rote memorization
strategy was sufficient (i.e., simply memorizing the correct item
in a given training pair; see Supplemental Analysis 1 and TableS3A). Furthermore, the link between amygdala/anterior hippo-
campus activity and performance was found to be significantly
greater during test trials, as compared to training trials, when
we directly compared these two types of trials in an additional
analysis where performance was captured solely by the correct-
ness of participants’ choices (i.e., without inclusion of confi-
dence ratings: see Supplemental Analysis 2 and Figure S1).
Finally, we examined the possibility that the observed correla-
tion between neural activity in the amygdala/anterior hippo-
campus and social transitivity performance might have arisen
due to the specific measure of test trial performance used (i.e.,
the inference score index)—and in particular the inclusion of
participants’ confidence ratings. To examine this issue, we con-
ducted a further analysis where test trial performance was
captured solely by the binary choice data (i.e., as in Supple-
mental Analysis 2). Additionally, the time periods during which
participants made their choices and rated their confidence
were modeled separately in the general linear model (see
Supplemental Analysis 3 and Figure S1). These data provide
evidence that the correlation between neural activity in the
amygdala/anterior hippocampus and transitivity performance
is robust to the exclusion of the confidence data from the anal-
ysis—and relates specifically to successful choice during test
trials, rather than participants’ metacognitive report about
subjective confidence in their choice.
Neural Activity in the Posterior Hippocampus Tracks
the Emergence of Knowledge about Hierarchies in
a Domain-General Fashion
Given our evidence implicating the amygdala and anterior hippo-
campus selectively in knowledge about social hierarchies, we
next sought to identify brain regions whose activity during test
trials showed a significant correlation with the inference score
index, in both social and nonsocial domains. To achieve this,
we conducted a conjunction ‘‘null’’ analysis, which can be
considered a conservative procedure for ensuring that each indi-
vidual contrast is individually significant at a predefined
threshold (i.e., p < 0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons;
see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Strikingly, we
observed that neural activity in the posterior hippocampus,
and the vMPFC, paralleled the emergence of knowledge about
both social and nonsocial hierarchies (Figure 3B and Table
S2B). These findings dovetail with accounts that the hippo-
campus, together with the vMPFC, plays a domain-general
role during the emergence and application of relational knowl-
edge (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Eichenbaum, 2004; Ku-
maran et al., 2009)—and accord with the observation that
patients with damage to the vMPFC show a specific impairment
in performing transitive inferences (Koscik and Tranel, 2012).
Structural Neuroimaging Data: Voxel-Based
Morphometry Analyses
Amygdala Gray Matter Volume Correlates Selectively
with Transitivity Performance in Social Domain
Motivated by these results implicating the amygdala in the emer-
gence of knowledge about social hierarchies and previous work
linking variations in amygdala gray matter (GM) volume to inter-
individual differences in social network size in humans (Bickart
et al., 2011; Kanai et al., 2012) and nonhuman primates (BartonNeuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 657
AB Figure 4. Learn Phase, VBMResults: Amyg-
dala Gray Matter Volume Correlates Selec-
tively with Transitivity Performance in Social
Domain
(A) Results of whole-brain analysis. Upper panel:
gray matter volume in bilateral amygdala shows
a significant between-subjects correlation with
test trial performance in social domain, indexed by
the inference score (averaged across experimental
phase). Lower panel: close-up illustrating effect in
left amygdala. Display threshold is p < 0.005
uncorrected but effects in bilateral amygdala are
significant at p < 0.001 uncorrected, and p < 0.05
SVC corrected. Statistical maps displayed over
the average structural image of participants. See
Table S4A for full list of activations.
(B) Results of ROI analysis. Upper panel: scatter-
plot illustrating significant correlation between left
amygdala gray matter volume (averaged across
anatomical ROI—see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures) and intersubject differences in test
trial performance, indexed by inference score, in
social domain (left amygdala: r = 0.52 p = 0.003,
also significant in right amygdala: r = 0.51 p =
0.004). This correlation remained significant in an
analysis where the poorest performing participant
was excluded, and hippocampal gray matter
volume, performance on social training trials, and
nonsocial inference score were partialled out (left and right amygdala, both ps < 0.01). Lower panel: scatterplot showing absence of a significant correlation
between left amygdala GM and test trial performance in nonsocial domain (p > 0.1); see Supplemental Results for details.
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a voxel-based morphometry (VBM) analysis (see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). Notably, the differing nature of the
functional and structural analyses performed (i.e., within-
subjects versus between-subjects, respectively) mean that the
results so obtained provide independent lines of evidence
concerning the neural substrates supporting knowledge about
social hierarchies (see Supplemental Results).
We first carried out a whole-brain voxel-wise analysis to
examine the relationship between GM volume and behavioral
performance during the Learn phase. While participants
achieved near-perfect knowledge of both hierarchies by the
end of the experiment, individuals varied in their transitivity
performance during the Learn phase. We observed that the vari-
ability in participants’ performance during test trials in the social
domain, indexed by their inference score averaged across the
whole experimental phase, was significantly predicted by interin-
dividual variations in GM volume in the bilateral amygdala, and in
no other brain regions (Figure 4A and Table S4A). Further, the
correlation between GM volume in the amygdala and test trial
performance was found to be significantly greater in the social,
as compared to the nonsocial domain (Table S4B). No above
threshold correlations were observed in the nonsocial domain
(Table S4C).
We confirmed the robustness and specificity of the link
between interindividual differences in the structure of the amyg-
dala and social test trial (c.f. training trial) performance in two
ways: first, by verifying that this correlation remained robust
when test trial performance was captured solely by the binary
choice data (i.e., with the confidence ratings excluded)—and
second, in a region of interest (ROI) analysis in which GM volume658 Neuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.was averaged across an anatomically defined mask (see
Supplemental Results and Figure 4B). Notably, the observed
correlations were highly specific to social transitivity judgments:
no correlation was observed in relation to training trials where
hierarchy knowledge was not required and a memorization
strategy sufficient (p > 0.1; see Supplemental Results).
The results from the Learn phase provide converging evidence
implicating the amygdala in the emergence of knowledge about
social hierarchies. Taken together, our functional and structural
findings point toward the conclusion that the amygdala, together
with the hippocampus, participates in the representation of
knowledge about social hierarchies—an account which draws
upon the influential ‘‘memory storage’’ view of amygdala function
(Phelps and LeDoux, 2005). Specifically, our fMRI results, in
revealing a tight link between neural activity and performance
during test trials, where no feedback was provided, suggests
that the amygdala locally sustains neural representations of
social hierarchies, rather than acting to facilitate their formation
elsewhere (McGaugh, 2004). Furthermore, our VBM results—in
showing that amygdala GM volume correlates with behavioral
performance during social test trials—argue against a scenario
in which the amygdala only provides a downstream signal that
is triggered by the retrieval of hierarchy representations sus-
tained elsewhere (e.g., in the hippocampus) and rather suggest
that the amygdala itself contributes to the representation of
knowledge about social hierarchies.
Phase 2: Invest
In the next section of the fMRI experiment, we set out to probe
participants’ recently established representations of the hier-
archy and examine how rank information is coded in the brain.
AB
Figure 5. Invest Phase: Experimental Task and Behavioral Data
(A) Bid trials: example trial (left) and behavioral data from a typical participant (right). Left panel: participants were required to state themaximum amount of money
they would be willing to pay (i.e., WTP) to buy shares in potential projects on offer, denoted by the combination of a particular person and a particular galaxy (P4
and G2 shown), by positioning a cursor on a horizontal scale (a bid of £12.00 shown). The actual worth of the project was directly dependent on the rank of person
and galaxy presented, and one trial was randomly selected to be played out at the end of the experiment as a real money transaction using the BDMmechanism
(see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Right panel shows a color coded heatmap of the prices a typical participant waswilling to pay (i.e., WTP) for each of
the 49 projects (i.e., all combinations of 7 galaxies and people in the hierarchy) on offer (x axis, person rank; y axis, galaxy rank; hot colors indicate higher WTP
[from a minimum of £0 to a maximum of £20]).
(B) Control trials: example trial (left) and behavioral data from a typical participant (right). Left panel: participants were required to determine which of the two
items, person or galaxy (P7 G6 shown), was relatively higher in rank, and by how much: by positioning a cursor on a horizontal scale (response indicates that
galaxy was deemed to be slightly higher in rank). As in bid trials, one trial was randomly selected at the end of the experiment and participants were rewarded
according to the accuracy of their response. Right panel shows a color coded heatmap of the responses of a typical participant, for each of the 49 possible
combinations of galaxies (x axis, person rank; y axis, galaxy rank). Hot colors indicate that the galaxy was the higher ranking of the two items.
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express a linear signal selectively coding for the rank of the indi-
vidual person presented, when this information was motivation-
ally relevant to behavior.
During this phase of the experiment, participants viewed
person-galaxy combinations and were required to complete
two types of trials: bid and control trials (see Figure 5 and
Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Importantly, person
rank and galaxy rank were orthogonalized by experimental
design—all 49 person-galaxy combinations were presented
over trials—enabling us to characterize the relationship between
neural activity and rank, separately for each stimulus type.
During bid trials, participants decided how much they would
be willing to pay (i.e., WTP) for shares in potential projects on
offer, based on their evaluation of the worth of individual people
and galaxies (Figure 5A and Supplemental Experimental Proce-dures). Participants were instructed that the actual worth of
projects was directly dependent on the rank of the items pre-
sented along the relevant dimension (i.e., person: power/galaxy:
precious mineral content), and that one project would be
selected at the end of the experiment to be played out as a finan-
cial transaction using the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (BDM)
mechanism (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
Higher ranking items, therefore, were of greater motivational
significance during bid trials—the expected monetary return of
a given project depended on the rank of the items presented—
with projects involving high ranking items (e.g., P1 G1) being
inherently more valuable.
While control trials closely matched bid trials in terms of trial
presentation and cognitive demands (e.g., use of knowledge
about hierarchies), here participants were required to determine
which item was higher in its respective ‘‘pecking order’’ and byNeuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 659
Figure 6. Invest Phase, fMRI Results: Brain Regions Whose Activity
Showed a Significant Correlation with the Price Participants Were
Willing to Pay (i.e., WTP) during Bid Trials
Neural activity in the body of the left hippocampus (top panel, coronal section),
nucleus accumbens (right panel, coronal section), posterior cingulate, and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (bottom panel, sagittal section) shows a signif-
icant correlation with participants’ stated prices (i.e., WTP) during bid trials.
Activations thresholded at p < 0.005 uncorrected for display purposes but
significant in hippocampus/nucleus accumbens/posterior cingulate cortex at
p < 0.001 uncorrected and p < 0.05 whole-brain FWE corrected at cluster
level—and in vMPFC at p < 0.001 uncorrected and p < 0.05 SVC corrected.
See Table S5A for full list of activations.
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dures). In contrast to bid trials, therefore, higher ranking items
were not of greater motivational significance than items occu-
pying a lower rank position—as such control trials involving the
presentation of highly ranked items (e.g., P1 G1) were not inher-
ently more valuable in monetary terms to participants (c.f. trials
involving lowly ranked items: e.g., P7 G7)—renumeration was
based purely according to accuracy of cursor position on
a randomly chosen trial.
Behavioral Data
To characterize the influence of the rank of items presented on
participants’ prices (i.e., WTP) during bid trials, and responses
in the control task (i.e., indexed by position of the cursor on the
scale), we performed a linear regression analysis (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures). This confirmed that partici-
pants afforded equal weight to both person and galaxy rank in
their determination of the WTP of a given project, at a value that
was close to optimal based on the instructions they had received
(increase inWTP for each unit increase in person rank: £1.52 (SD
0.20), galaxy rank £1.55 (SD 0.29); no significant difference p >
0.1; optimal weighting = £1.67 per unit increase in person/galaxy
rank; Figure 5A). Further, the influence of person and galaxy rank
was not limited to the extremes of the hierarchy (i.e., highest or
lowest ranked items) but was close to linear in fashion across
the hierarchy (p < 0.001, r > 0.9). Similar findings were observed
during control trials: equal weight was given to both person and660 Neuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.galaxy rank (change in position of cursor on x axis for each unit
change in person rank: 39.6 (SD 4.4); galaxy rank 40.7 (SD 7.0);
no significant difference p > 0.1; optimal value = 41.5; Figure 5B).
The influence of rankwas also close to linear across the hierarchy
(p < 0.001, r > 0.9), for both people and galaxies.
Further, participants rated the dimension of social rank as
being subjectively realistic in the postexperimental debriefing
session (mean 7.1 [out of 10], SD 2.9), attesting to the effective-
ness of our experimental manipulation (see Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures). Participants were also asked to rate the
face stimuli according to trustworthiness and attractiveness
(i.e., in the debriefing session): while no significant correlation
was observed between rank and these parameters (ps > 0.1),
therewas a significant correlation between ratings of trustworthi-
ness and attractiveness in line with previous data (r = 0.44,
p < 0.001; Todorov et al., 2008).
Functional Neuroimaging Data (fMRI)
Given behavioral evidence that participants had deployed
knowledge about both social and nonsocial hierarchies to inform
their behavior in near-optimal fashion, we next turned to the fMRI
data. We first set up a parametric model to identify brain regions
whose activation pattern exhibited a significant linear correlation
with the maximum amount of money participants were willing
to pay for shares in a project during bid trials (i.e., WTP), with
reaction time included in the model as a covariate of no
interest (parametric model 1: see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures).
We found that neural activity in the hippocampus and vMPFC
showed a significant correlation with participants’ WTP (Figure 6
and Table S5A), consistent with previous work suggesting that
the vMPFC encodes decision value during economic transac-
tions through the integration of both social and nonsocial sour-
ces of value information (Rangel et al., 2008; Rushworth et al.,
2011). Further, these findings provide support for perspectives
proposing that the hippocampus and vMPFC may jointly
contribute to goal-directed decision making, with the former
neural structure housing recently acquired representations of
the task structure which are passed to the latter for integration
into choice behavior (Roy et al., 2012).
We next sought to characterize the pattern of neural signals
coding for rank information. To achieve this, we set up a para-
metric model in which the linear and quadratic effects of person
and galaxy rank were modeled by separate regressors, with
response time included as an additional regressor to control
for nonspecific effects (fMRI parametric model 2; see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures). While neural activity in the
hippocampus, and vMPFC, showed a significant linear correla-
tion with both person and galaxy rank during bid trials, the corre-
lation in the amygdala was specific to person rank (Figures 7A
and 7B; Table S6A). Indeed, no significant correlation was
present between rank and amygdala activity in the nonsocial
domain even at liberal statistical thresholds (i.e., p < 0.01 uncor-
rected; Table S6B). Further, equivalent findings were observed in
an analysis where we included participant-specific ratings of
attractiveness and trustworthiness obtained from the postexper-
imental debriefing session as regressors in the general linear
model (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). As such,
A B
Figure 7. Invest Phase, fMRI Results: Evidence of Selective Person Rank Coding in Amygdala, and Domain-General Coding of Rank in Hippo-
campus, during Bid Trials
(A) Domain-general coding of rank in hippocampus during bid trials. Left panels: results of whole-brain voxelwise analysis—neural activity in body of hippo-
campus shows significant correlation with person rank (top panel) and galaxy rank (bottom panel) during bid trials. Coronal sections show activations in
hippocampal body. Activations thresholded at p < 0.005 uncorrected for display purposes, but significant at p < 0.001 uncorrected and p < 0.05 SVC corrected
(see Tables S6A and S6B for full list of activations). Right panels: parameter estimates averaged across left hippocampal ROI defined based on an orthogonal
selection contrast, as a function of person rank (top panel) and galaxy rank (bottom panel) (see Supplemental Results and Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures). Note these plots were derived from an ‘‘illustrative’’ model which included separate regressors for person and galaxy rank. Statistical inference, however,
was based strictly on the parametric model.
(B) Selective coding of person rank in amygdala during bid trials. Left panels: results of whole-brain voxel-wise analysis: activity in bilateral amygdala shows
a significant correlation with person rank during bid trials: Top panel: coronal section, taken at level of peak in right amygdala. Bottom panel: close-up of activation
in left amygdala at level of peak voxel. Activations are thresholded at p < 0.005 uncorrected for display purposes but are significant in amygdala at p < 0.05 SVC
corrected (see Table S6A for full list of activations). Right panels illustrate parameter estimates averaged across left amygdala ROI defined based on an
orthogonal selection contrast, as a function of person rank (above), and galaxy rank (below) (see Supplemental Results and Experimental Procedures). Significant
linear correlation between neural activity in left amygdala and person, but not galaxy, rank evident.
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the amygdala during bid trials specifically codes person rank,
and cannot be accounted for along the lines of differences in
perceived attractiveness or trustworthiness.
We next explored the specificity of the link between amygdala
activity and person rank, and the effects of task context (i.e., bid
versus control trials), by performing an ROI analysis (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures and Supplemental Results for
full details of repeated-measures ANOVA). We observed that
activity within an ROI within the left amygdala, which was func-
tionally defined based on an orthogonal selection contrast (see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures and Table S5B),
showed a significantly greater correlation with person, as
compared to galaxy, rank (t(24) = 2.3, two-tailed p = 0.03) during
bid trials, an effect that was not present in a functionally defined
region of the hippocampus (p > 0.1; see Supplemental Results).
Moreover, person rank coding in the amygdala was observed to
be significantly stronger during bid trials - where rank information
was of direct motivational relevance—as compared to control
trials (t(24) = 2.2, two-tailed p = 0.04; Figure S2 and Supple-
mental Results). Finally, we also found evidence linking the
strength of the neural signal coding for person rank in the amyg-
dala to behavior, with more robust coding in a given participant
associatedwith greater influence of person rank on theirWTP (r =
0.41, p = 0.02; see Supplemental Results).In summary, the findings from the Invest phase suggest that
the amygdala selectively expressed a signal coding for person
rank during bid trials, where highly ranked individuals carried
greater worth, and provide evidence of the behavioral signifi-
cance of this signal. In contrast, our results indicate that the
hippocampus plays a domain-general role in coding the rank
of items in both social and nonsocial hierarchies. Our data relate
closely to empirical evidence which demonstrates that the
amygdala plays a role in representing the value of appetitive
and aversive stimuli in the environment, in a fashion that is
shaped by task context and motivational relevance, and can
be closely linked to behavior (Balleine and Killcross, 2006; Baxter
and Murray, 2002; Davis et al., 2010; Morrison and Salzman,
2010; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005). As such, our observation that
neural activity within the amygdala tracks person rank during
bid trials, as well as the finding that the robustness of amygdala
coding of person rank across participants correlates with
behavior, is highly consistent with previous work demonstrating
that neural activity within the amygdala tracks stimulus-value
associations, and can be tightly linked to behavioral output
(e.g., Morrison and Salzman, 2010). Furthermore, the finding
that amygdala coding of person rank was selective to bid trials
and not observed in control trials where higher ranking individ-
uals did not inherently signal higher monetary return, accords
well with the notion that stimulus-value coding in the amygdalaNeuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 661
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and Murray, 2002).
However, it is important to note one important point of diver-
gence between our data and domain-general accounts of value
coding in the amygdala (e.g., Baxter and Murray, 2002; Morrison
and Salzman, 2010): in our experiment, the amygdala was found
to selectively code the worth of individuals based on their posi-
tion in a social hierarchy, a finding which dovetails with the
social-specific recruitment of the amygdala observed during
the emergence of knowledge about hierarchies in the Learn
phase. Importantly, this result cannot be explained by differ-
ences in terms of behavior: participants’ weighted person and
galaxy rank equivalently during the decision process, with rank
information influencing their WTP in a linear fashion in both
domains.
One reason for the apparent discrepancy between our results
and domain-general accounts of amygdala function is that value
computation in our experiment was necessarily based on rela-
tional knowledge of a hierarchy (Cohen and Eichenbaum,
1993)—a qualitatively different experimental setting from the
simpler forms of associative learning studied previously (Baxter
and Murray, 2002; Davis et al., 2010; Morrison and Salzman,
2010). Alternatively, our findings may reflect a broader role for
the amygdala in preferentially coding the value of social (c.f.
nonsocial) stimuli during decision making (i.e., ‘‘decision
values’’; Rangel et al., 2008)—a hypothesis that merits scrutiny
given the paucity of studies that have examined this question.
Notably, previous work that has examined the role of the amyg-
dala in coding stimulus values have typically explored this ques-
tion separately in social (Davis et al., 2010) and nonsocial
domains (Morrison and Salzman, 2010). As such, the few studies
that have directly compared value computation in social and
nonsocial domains have done so in a quite different experimental
context—involving the processing of rewarding outcomes (i.e.,
‘‘experienced value’’) such as attractive faces (social) andmoney
(nonsocial) (Lin et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2010). In the future, it will
be of interest to ask whether our finding, that the amygdala plays
a selective role in coding decision values in the social domain
based on hierarchical knowledge, generalizes to a wider range
of experimental scenarios.
The Amygdala and Knowledge about Social Hierarchies
Taken together, the present study provides converging
evidence, obtained using a combination of structural and func-
tional neuroimaging techniques, which specifically implicates
the amygdala in the emergence of knowledge about a social
hierarchy through experience. Our findings further demonstrate
that neural activity in the amygdala selectively discloses the
worth of other individuals based on their rank, a signal that could
potentially be useful in guiding the selection of advantageous
coalition partners (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Tomasello and
Call, 1997).
Further investigation, however, is required to delineate the full
range of conditions under which the amygdala is recruited. Our
paradigm was motivated by the emphasis placed on the dimen-
sion of power/dominance in organizing social hierarchies in
human and nonhuman primates (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990;
Cummins, 2000; Magee and Galinsky, 2008). Nevertheless, it is662 Neuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.worth noting that social hierarchies are often viewed to extend
beyond the dimension of power—as such, they have been
more broadly construed as denoting the rank order of individuals
with respect to any valued social dimension (Magee and Galin-
sky, 2008). It would be potentially illuminating, therefore, to
ask whether the amygdala might be similarly recruited when
participants acquired knowledge of a social hierarchy where
individuals were ranked according to another valued social
dimension—namely trustworthiness—an experiment that would
have particular relevance given the importance of this dimension
to the evaluation of unfamiliar faces based on perceptual infor-
mation (see discussion later; Adolphs et al., 1998; Todorov
et al., 2008; Winston et al., 2002). Furthermore, one could also
examine the relationship between the nature of stimulus used
to depict different individuals in the hierarchy, and the recruit-
ment of the amygdala. While our experiment was guided by
the pivotal role attributed to visual face processing in the learning
and expression of knowledge about social hierarchies (Byrne
and Bates, 2010; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Deaner et al.,
2005), one could conceive of a scenario in which symbolic stimuli
(e.g., person names) were used, instead of face images. Though
such an experimental design would likely not eliminate the oper-
ation of visual face processing—participants would likely conjure
up images of familiar people to associate with each name—
future investigation along these lines may help to further charac-
terize the contribution of the amygdala to supporting knowledge
about social hierarchies.
In contrast to our study, previous work has tended to explore
how the dominance of individuals that have never previously
been encountered is judged based on perceptual cues (Karafin
et al., 2004; Todorov et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2009; also see:
Thomsen et al., 2011)—rather than information about their rank
in the hierarchy acquired through experience. One avenue of
research has examined how unfamiliar individuals are rapidly
evaluated based on visual information present in face features,
according to two principal dimensions of valence/trustworthi-
ness and power/dominance (Todorov et al., 2008; Whalen,
1998). While substantial data suggests that the amygdala codes
the trustworthiness of an unfamiliar face based on perceptual
features (Adolphs et al., 1998; Winston et al., 2002), evidence
concerning its role in signaling dominance has been lacking
(Todorov et al., 2011). Our study, by revealing the existence of
a robust signal coding for the rank of an individual based on
knowledge of a social hierarchy (c.f. perceptual features),
provide support for the hypothesis that the amygdala may be
engaged in dominance evaluation, when this dimension is of
motivational importance (Todorov et al., 2008).
A largely separate line of work has investigated how more
general cues of status, such as body posture and attire, influence
behavior (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003), dominance
judgments (Karafin et al., 2004; Mah et al., 2004), and neural
processing (Marsh et al., 2009; Zink et al., 2008). These previous
studies have shown that activity in the prefrontal cortex, and in
certain conditions the amygdala, is upregulated when partici-
pants view high status individuals, where information about
status is conveyed through their body posture (e.g., outward
pose) (Marsh et al., 2009) or explicitly presented (i.e., star rating)
(Zink et al., 2008). For instance, in a study by Marsh et al. (2009),
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observed when participants viewed images of a high-status
(c.f. low-status) individual, whose status was revealed by their
physical appearance (e.g., body posture and gaze direction),
rather than learned through experience as in our experiment. In
the future, it will be important to integrate these different strands
of research—in particular, it will be interesting to explore the
neural mechanisms by which individuals integrate perceptual
information (e.g., facial appearance, body posture), information
gained through linguistic discourse with their peers, with knowl-
edge about the social hierarchy of their group that has been
acquired through experience, to make accurate judgments of
the rank of others.
The Hippocampus: Neural Representations of Social
and Nonsocial Hierarchies
While previous work has implicated the hippocampus in the
generation of transitive inferences (e.g., Dusek and Eichenbaum,
1997), there has been little direct evidence concerning its role in
the emergence and representation of knowledge about linear
hierarchies, despite the pervasive influence of these structures
across a range of cognitive domains (Kemp and Tenenbaum,
2008). In contrast to previous studies (e.g., Moses et al., 2010),
our experiment was specifically set up to examine how knowl-
edge about hierarchies develops through experience and is
represented at the neural level—through the incorporation of
trial-by-trial behavioral indices in each experimental phase
(e.g., inference score) that permitted investigation of the under-
lying neural mechanisms.
Our data point to the existence of a dissociation between the
respective roles of the anterior and posterior regions of the
hippocampus during the emergence of knowledge about hierar-
chies. As such, the anterior hippocampus, and the amygdala,
were selectively recruited during the emergence of knowledge
about a social hierarchy—a finding that sits comfortably with
the massive bidirectional connectivity between these two
regions, and their synergistic contribution to emotional memory
(Fanselow and Dong, 2010). It is interesting to relate the current
findings to those of a previous study (Kumaran and Maguire,
2005), which found that knowledge of one’s social network—
another variety of social knowledge with relational qualities
(i.e., capturing the relations that exist between different individ-
uals)—was supported by neocortical regions including the
medial prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus, rather
than structures within the medial temporal lobe. Critically,
however, in this study participants’ knowledge of their social
network was well established, having been acquired several
months previously. While further work is required, these findings
collectively suggest that the hippocampusmay play a role during
the initial emergence and representation of relational forms of
social knowledge (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993)—but that
this information is ultimately consolidated to the neocortex for
long-term storage (Eichenbaum, 2004; McClelland et al., 1995).
In contrast to the social-specific recruitment of the anterior
hippocampus observed during the emergence of knowledge
about hierarchies during the Learn phase, the engagement of
the posterior hippocampus was domain general in nature.
Further, the hippocampal body was found to code the rank ofindividual items in a domain-general fashion during the Invest
phase, providing compelling evidence that the linear structure
of hierarchies is represented at the neural level. Together, these
data suggest that the hippocampus supports domain-general
representations of hierarchical knowledge and provide insights
into how such information may be integrated into the computa-
tion of decision values, putatively in regions such as the vMPFC
(Rangel et al., 2008; Roy et al., 2012; Rushworth et al., 2011).
More generally, the present study adds to growing evidence
that the hippocampus may play an important role in supporting
neural representations that code for the overall structure of a
set of related experiences (Eichenbaum, 2004; Kumaran et al.,
2009; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008) and highlights the need for
formal computational models that are able to marry such a
function with its widely acknowledged role in episodic memory
(Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; McClelland et al., 1995).
Conclusions
Primates possess sophisticated knowledge of the rank relations
that exist between fellow members of their social group (Byrne
and Bates, 2010; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Tomasello and
Call, 1997), yet surprisingly little is understood about the under-
lying neural mechanisms. Our data offer concrete evidence that
the amygdala forms part of the specialized neural machinery that
operates during the emergence and expression of knowledge
about social hierarchies and illuminates the distinct contribution
of the hippocampus to the domain-general representation of
hierarchies. More generally, the current study provides support
for the viewpoint that the evolution of the primate amygdala
may have been driven by the challenging cognitive demands of
a rich and varied social life (Adolphs, 2003)—and underscores
the importance of defining how other forms of social knowledge
(c.f. social networks) may emerge from a rich tapestry of
previous experiences.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Here, we provide an overview of the experimental tasks and the procedures
used to analyze the fMRI data; full details are provided in the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures.
Participants
Twenty-six healthy, right-handed individuals who were currently undertaking
or had completed a university degree, participated in this experiment (age
range 19–31; 12 female). One of these participants failed to fully learn either
person or galaxy hierarchies and was therefore excluded from the fMRI anal-
yses. All participants gave informed written consent to participation in accor-
dance with the local research ethics committee.
Stimuli
Face pictures were obtained from a widely used database (Stirling database:
http://pics.stir.ac.uk). Pictures of galaxies (source: various sites on the internet
including http://hubblesite.org/gallery/album/nebula) were chosen to be
distinct from one another. Prior to each scanning session, participants briefly
performed a simple one-back task where they viewed each individual face and
galaxy three times, in order to minimize stimulus novelty effects during
scanning.
Description of Tasks
Participants were instructed that they would be playing a simple science-
fiction computer game, acting as an investor in the future. They were toldNeuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 663
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more power within a fictitious space mining company and which galaxies
have more precious mineral. In phase two (‘‘Invest’’ phase), they were told
that they would need to use knowledge acquired during phase one to decide
how much they would be willing to pay for potential projects on offer—where
a project constituted the combination of a particular person and a particular
galaxy (i.e., as if the person would be heading up a mission to go to the galaxy
to harvest minerals).
The Learn phase paradigm is grounded in classic implementations of the
transitive inference task (Bryant and Trabasso, 1971), where dimensions
such as length and weight were emphasized (c.f. mineral content in our study).
In this phase, participants acquired knowledge about the seven-item person
and galaxy hierarchies in parallel with blocks of training trials (i.e., six training
pairs, presented in pseudorandom order: e.g., P1 versus P2, P2 versus P3, P3
versus P4, P4 versus P5, P5 versus P6, P6 versus P7; see Figure 1A for details)
interleaved with blocks of test trials (i.e., six inference pairs, presented in pseu-
dorandomorder: e.g., P2 versus P4, P2 versus P5, P2 versus P6, P3 versus P5,
P3 versus P6, P4 versus P6; see Figure 1B; for details, see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures).
In the Invest phase, participants were required to use their knowledge about
person and galaxy hierarchies to decide (1) howmuch in realmonetary terms to
pay for potential projects on offer (‘‘bid’’ trials: see Figure 5A and Supplemental
Experimental Procedures), by evaluating the potential worth of individual
people andgalaxies basedon their rank, or (2)which item (i.e., personor galaxy)
was more highly ranked, and by how much (‘‘control’’ trials: see Figure 5B).
fMRI Data Acquisition
T2 weighted gradient-echo planar images (EPI) with BOLD (blood oxygen
level-dependent) contrast were acquired on a 3.0 tesla Siemens Allegra MRI
scanner using a specialized sequence to acquire whole-brain coverage, while
minimizing signal dropout in the medial temporal lobe and ventromedial
prefrontal cortex. High-resolution (1 3 1 3 1 mm) T1-weighted structural
MRI scan were also acquired for each participant after functional scanning.
fMRI Data Analysis
Images were preprocessed and analyzed in a standard manner using the
statistical parametric mapping software SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/SPM).
Details of the parametric models used are given below: see Supplemental
Information for full details of procedures used for model specification, estima-
tion, statistical inference, and ROI analyses.
Specification of First-Level Design Matrix: Phase 1 (Learn)
The following participant-specific trial-by-trial parametric regressors were
included (in the order stated) in the first level design matrix relating to test trials
(see Supplemental Information for specification of training trial, and other
regressors also included in the model [e.g., movement parameters, etc.]):
(1) Trial-by-trial reaction time (RT); (2) probability_correct: following previous
studies (e.g., Kumaran et al., 2009) trial-by-trial estimates of the probability of
a correct response derived from learning curves were constructed separately
for each of the six test pairs (e.g., P2 P4) using the state-space model (Smith
et al., 2004); (3) inference score (range 0–3; see above).
All test trial types (i.e., six pairs: P2 versus P4, P2 versus P5, P2 versus P6,
P3 versus P5, P3 versus P6, P4 versus P6) were modeled within these regres-
sors, with one regressor for the person condition and one for the galaxy
condition.
Specification of First-Level Design Matrix: Phase 2 (Invest)
We set up two different parametric models to detect brain regions whose
activation pattern (1) exhibited a significant linear correlationwith themaximum
amount of money participants were willing to pay for shares in a project during
bid trials (i.e., WTP) and (2) showed a significant linear correlation with the rank
of person or galaxy in the hierarchy, during bid or control trials.
The following vectors were then included as parametric modulators in the
design matrix (in order): fMRI parametric model one—(1) trial-by-trial reaction
time (RT), (2) WTP: participants’ statedmaximumprice that they were willing to
pay for the shares in the project; fMRI parametric model two—(1) trial-by-trial
reaction time (RT), (2) galaxy rank, (3) person rank.
These parametric regressors were convolved with the HRF, leading to the
height of the HRF for a given event being modulated accordingly. Thus, these664 Neuron 76, 653–666, November 8, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.regressors model BOLD signal changes that covary with specific behavioral
indices of performance on a given trial (e.g., inference score during test trials
in phase 1).
Statistical Inference
We report results in a priori regions of interest—the hippocampus, amygdala
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex—where activations are significant at
p < 0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons and survive small volume
correction (SVC) for multiple comparisons (at p < 0.05 corrected) using
SPM8 (e.g., using anatomical masks for hippocampus and amygdala; see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details). Activations in other brain
regions were only considered significant if they were significant at a level of
p < 0.001 uncorrected and additionally survived whole brain FWE correction
at the cluster level (p < 0.05 corrected).SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes two figures, six tables, and supplemental
text and can be found with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.neuron.2012.09.035.
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